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Concentration of the commercial banking market 
in Hungary53
Margit Kerekes54, Ph.D student
Szent István University Gödöllő
Management and Business Administration PhD School 
ABSTRACT The most commonly applied model for measuring the intensity of com-
petition in the banking market is the Panzar-Rosse (PR) model. This model helps to 
determine whether the market competition on a given market is monopolistic, oli-
gopolistic or fair. The Panzar-Rosse model tends to determine H-statistic that summa-
rizes the specific bank interest income (margin) on input price elasticity coefficients. 
H measures the degree of competition and it is the sum of the elasticity coefficients 
on factor prices of equilibrium interest income. The main advantage of H-statistic is 
that the indicator whose value lies between 0 and 1 reflects the degree of competition 
as a continuous variable. The closer the value is to 1, the stronger the competition is 
and vice versa. H-statistic’s data requirement is minor, its estimation is simple. These 
relationships were examined between 2005 and 2010 in Hungary.
KEYWORDS: bank, competition, degree of concentration
Introduction
In Hungary a two-tier banking system exists, which means that aside the central 
bank (National Bank of Hungary) subordinated commercial banks, specialized 
credit institutions and other financial institutions can be found. Banks located on 
the lower level of the banking system keep direct contact with the business enti-
ties; they manage companies’ and households’ accounts (Szente 2007).
In Hungary, commercial banks are privatized; most of them are in foreign 
ownership, which ensures the banking system not being too dependent on the 
central bank. The central bank does not induce excessive careless lending, but 
helps distressed banks if there is a “real” crisis in the system (Árvai – Vincze 1998).
The banking sector plays an important role in the performance of the econo-
my as a whole. On one hand, their contribution to GDP is significant and on the 
other hand, efficient market economy would not exist without banks’ efficient 
financial intermediary role. (www.bankszovetseg.hu 2008) Commercial banks’ 
development processes imply concentration, the examination of which may lead 
to drawing important conclusions.
53  A tanulmány megjelenését a TÁMOP - 4.2.2. B - 10/1 - 2010 - 0018. számú projekt támogatta.
54  mkerekes@upcmail.hu
DOI: 10.21637/GT.2012.3-4.05.
71Concentration of the commercial banking market in Hungary
Hungarian banks and the competitive situations
Two disputant views prevail in the professional literature of banking competition. 
The first is the projection of conventional approach (analytical framework formed 
to industrial organizations focusing on efficient production) on the banking mar-
ket too, meaning that the stronger competition is also desirable among banks, as 
it allows to minimize costs, as well as to promote prices of banking services that 
facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. The other view is that if banks have 
market power they will use it to charge higher lending rates and pay lower deposit 
interest rates, hereby increasing transaction costs and distorting consumers’ and 
producers’ savings and investment decisions.
First of all, it shall be clear what is meant by bank competitiveness at the as-
sessment of competition among banks. According to Ábel - Polivka (1997), banks’ 
performances need to be evaluated primarily from the consumers’ point of view. 
Nowadays, when banks symbolize the economy, the wealth and the huge failures 
customers are particularly inspired by the price and the quality of services when 
choosing a bank. The condition of the banks’ effective participation in the compe-
tition is thus to meet clients’ (consumers’) needs as widely as possible.
Previously, a variety of theoretical and empirical studies were carried out to as-
sess bank competition and stability, however, these investigations could not reach a 
unanimous conclusion. There were studies specifically assessing the impacts of bank 
mergers, some of which confirmed that the increased market power caused by the 
mergers reduces risk-taking and also increases profitability. However, other exami-
nations showed just the opposite, according to which increasing diversification due 
to mergers does not reduce but - on the basis of the “too big to fail” principle - it 
may also increase risk-taking propensity. Homolya (2011) says that larger institu-
tions tend to apply more advanced operational risk management methods, despite of 
the fact that there is no significant difference between profitability and risk-taking. 
For measuring the degree of competition among the examined banks for the 
investigated period I also applied the determination of this field’s most commonly 
used H-statistic based on the Panzar-Rosse model55.
The Panzar-Rosse’s H-statistic model
According to models published in professional literature that can be used to 
describe competition in banking markets two main groups exist: structural and 
non-structural approaches.
55  “Molyneaux (1999), a pioneer in researching banking competition states that in terms 
of competition it is more important to decrease the distance between the market leader and the 
second largest bank than the indicators describing overall market concentration degree, since the 
strengthening position plays an important motivating factor to market players”. (Várhegyi, 2010b)
DOI: 10.21637/GT.2012.3-4.05.
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The structural approach in a broader sense includes the examination of hy-
potheses explaining the relationship between market structure and banks’ perfor-
mances, such as the structure - conduct - performance (SCP) paradigm and the 
relative market power (RMP) hypothesis.
The SCP hypothesis assumes that higher concentration increases the risk of 
collusion between banks that enables to achieve greater profit through the use of 
higher prices. (Móré-Nagy 2003)
The RMP hypothesis assumes that only those banks are able to exercise market 
power in pricing and thus realizing extra profit that own large market shares and 
offer well-differentiated products (Farkas 2010).
The structural approach is rarely used to model competition among banks 
due to its contradictory results; instead, non-structural models start to spread that 
investigate banks’ behaviour separate from the market structure. These include 
the Panzar-Rosse (PR) model, which is the most commonly applied model for 
measuring the intensity of competition in the banking market. This model helps 
to determine whether the market competition on a given market is monopolistic, 
oligopolistic or fair.
The Panzar-Rosse model tends to determine H-statistic that summarizes 
the specific bank interest income (margin) on input price elasticity coefficients. 
(Bikker–Spierdijk-Finnie 2007) H measures the degree of competition and it is 
the sum of the elasticity coefficients on factor prices (FP) of equilibrium interest 
income (II), which can be expressed by the following formula:
   
   H =Σ(∂II / ∂FP)(FP / II)
Panzar-Rosse model states:
• if H ≤ 0 monopoly equilibrium evolves: each bank operates independently 
as it would maximize its profit in a monopoly environment or in a perfect 
cartel (this is more likely in a multiplayer market),  
• if  0 < H < 1 there is monopolistic competition on the market with free en-
try (the value of H increases with respect to demand elasticity),
• if H = 1 perfect competition characterises the market (Várhegyi 2004)
The main advantage of H-statistic estimated with Panzar-Rosse model is that 
the indicator whose value lies between 0 and 1 reflects the degree of competition 
as a continuous variable. The closer the value is to 1, the stronger the competition 
is and vice versa. H-statistic’s data requirement is minor, its estimation is simple 
(Pénzügykutató 2008).
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The determination of H-statistic
All commercial banks were involved in the study, which continuously operat-
ed during the investigated period (2005-2010) in Hungary. Banks included in the 
study are as follows in alphabetical order:
1) Banco Popolare Hungary Zrt.
2) Bank of China (Hungary) Close Ltd.
3) Budapest Hitel- és Fejlesztési Bank Rt.
4) CIB Közép-Európai Nemzetközi Bank Ltd.
5) Commerzbank Zrt.
6) Deutsche Bank Zrt.
7) Erste Bank Hungary Rt.
8) Gránit Bank Zrt.
9) Hanwha Bank Hungary Co. Ltd.
10) KDB Bank (Hungary) Ltd.
11) Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank Rt.
12) Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti Bank Rt.
13) Volksbank Hungary Ltd.
14) Merkantil Váltó- és Vagyonbefektető Bank Rt.
15) MKB Bank Nyrt.
16) Országos Takarékpénztár és Kereskedelmi Bank Plc.
17) Porsche Bank Hungária Zrt.
18) Raiffeisen Bank Zrt.
19) Sopron Bank Burgenland Zrt.
20) UniCredit Bank Hungary Zrt.
Table 1. shows the development of the Hungarian banking market’s concentra-
tion for the investigated period. 
Table 1. The development of the Hungarian banking market’s concentration
Year Number of banks
The proportion of 
large banks (%) HI - all banks HI - large banks
a) b) c) d) e)
2005 20 91.45 1 343 1 333
2006 20 92.13 1 368 1 359
2007 20 91.81 1 352 1 342
2008 20 91.67 1 292 1 281
2009 20 92.60 1 383 1 374
2010 20 92.22 1 363 1 353
Source: Own calculation based on the banks’ annual reports
DOI: 10.21637/GT.2012.3-4.05.
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Herfindahl index (HI) - also known as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
- is a measure of market concentration. It is defined as the sum of the squares of 
the market shares expressed in percentage, a concentration index for measuring 
banks’ size structure.
The value of HHI ranges from 0 to 1. Values close to 0 mean that there is a huge 
number of players in the market with low market shares, whereas values close to 
1 reflect a monopolistic or at least an oligopolistic situation.
It can also be expressed as a percentage (HI); in this case the index ranges from 
0 to 10.000. This is actually the sum of squares of market share percentages56. 
Herfindahl index (HI) in the table is determined by analysing all the examined 
banks’ market shares, results are shown in column d). HI was further examined in 
relation to the large banks57, it is included in column e).
By determining the value of the index I examined each bank’s market share sepa-
rately and the percentage of their annual balance sheet total out of all banks’ balance 
sheet total. The market shares in percentages were squared, and then summed.
It can be seen that HI values have not been significantly changed between 2005 
and 2010 neither in case of all banks nor in case of large banks. The concentration 
of the banking market slightly reduced only in 2008 during the investigated period.
In terms of market power it is important to note that the HI values of large banks 
are almost the same as it is for all the examined banks each year. In my opinion, this 
is mainly due to that - as it is shown in column c) of the table - large banks’ balance 
sheet total exceeds 90 percent of the banking sector’s balance sheet total.
“According to the competition rules of the United States of America Herfindahl 
index below 1000 indicates an unconcentrated market, values between 1000 and 
1800 indicates moderate concentration while values above 1800 indicates high 
market concentration”. (Várhegyi 2003, p. 1032) On the basis of the above, I con-
cluded that the banking market in Hungary was moderately concentrated in the 
investigated period.
Following the definition of the banking market’s concentration, I searched to 
find an answer for the intensity of competition in Hungary in a balanced market 
structure and how it changed between 2005 and 2010. During my research I an-
alysed the lending market competition58. Basically, the main source of banking 
income is interest income which is largely dependent on what margin banks can 
56  In Hungary, the HFSA and the central bank have been monitoring the Herfindahl index of our 
banking system since 1990. In 2005 Hungary’s Herfindahl index was 795, in 2010 it was 1007. (Kis, 
2011)
57  Large banks: BB, CIB, Erste, K&H, MKB, OTP, Raiffeisen, UniCredit
58  The banking market can not only be characterized on the basis of the credit market compe-
tition. Banks have some quality characteristics, which can not be measured and they have other 
measurable factors besides interest, on which banking market can also be characterized, such as 
fees, commissions, and other associated costs.
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apply between loan and deposit interest rates. In the Panzar-Rosse model market 
power is measured by how a unit change in input prices is reflected in the equilib-
rium income of a given bank (Várhegyi 2003).
To determine H-statistic in the period of 2005-2010 altogether 120 panel data 
were used for the total of 20 banks. The parameters of the linear regression model 
were determined by SPSS 16.00 statistical software package. The model was run 
by the ENTER procedure, in which all independent variables are simultaneously 
included in the model and their combined effect is examined. The test model’s 
independent variables were as follows:
x1 = interest payables (million HUF)
x2 = general administrative cost (million HUF)
x3 = income on other (non-interest rate) assets (equity capital plus inter-
est-bearing assets (securities held for trading + securities held for invest-
ment + bank and interbank deposits + loans)) (million HUF)
x4 = bank-specific factor affecting interest income - the ratio of loans to total 
assets (%)
x5 = bank-specific factor affecting interest income - equity on assets (%)
The dependent variable of the model is y1 = interest income (also called inter-
est margin or interest spread).
The results
The classic Panzar-Rosse model distinguishes three factor prices: the interest ex-
pense, personnel expenses and the costs of physical capital and materials. In my 
research I differentiated only two factor prices as in the Hungarian banks’ public 
profit and loss statements only the general administrative expenses summarizing 
other costs can be extracted besides interest payables.
Table 2. Interest income equation’s estimated results for all investigated 
banks - ENTER procedure
Model R R2 Adjusted R-squared Standard error of the estimate
1 0.974a 0.949 0.947 0.41177
Source: Own calculation
Two significant variables can be identified by having the model evaluated by 
the ENTER procedure: the general administrative costs and the ratio of loans to 
total assets (Table 3.).
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Table 3. Significant variables of the interest income equation’s estimated results 
for all investigated banks
Model  
Un-
standar-
dized coeffi-
cients
 
Standar-
dized co-
efficients
t
The t-test’s 
empirical 
significance 
level
Measurement of 
multicollinearity
    Standard error Beta    
Tolerance 
index VIF
1 (Constant) -5.251 0.663 -7.919 0
ln (general administra-
tive cost) 0.221 0.093 0.209 2.379 0.019 0.058 17.184
ln (interest payables) -0.015 0.069 -0.019 -0.219 0.827 0.062 16.091
ln (income on other 
(non-interest rate) 
assets)
0.839 0.124 0.847 6.752 0 0.029 35.055
ln (the ratio of loans to 
total assets) 0.211 0.065 0.079 3.264 0.001 0.772 1.295
ln (equity on assets) 0.44 0.094 0.148 4.666 0 0.449 2.227
a. Depen-
dent variab-
le: ln (II)
Number of panel data: 120
Value of H-statistic 0.221
Source: Own calculation
In the determination of the value of H-statistic the model’s explanatory power (r2) 
is 94.9%. This means that the independent variables of Table 3. anticipate a change 
in the value of H-statistic with 94.9% probability.
The H-value summarizing the estimated coefficients of the factor prices af-
fecting interest income is 0.221, which is highly significantly different from 0 and 
1, meaning that in the period of 2005-2010 neither cartel, nor perfect competi-
tion characterized the Hungarian banking market. My estimation showed weak 
oligopolistic competition for all banks.
It is also worth mentioning that the interest payables are not significant in this 
case, since the empirical significance level of the T-test is 82.7%.
Continuing the investigation I also determined the value of the H-statistic for 
size categories whose result can be seen in Table 4. and 5.
Independent and dependent variables of the study are the same as those used 
at the determination of H-statistic. 
DOI: 10.21637/GT.2012.3-4.05.
77Concentration of the commercial banking market in Hungary
Table 4. Interest income equation’s estimated results by size categories - ENTER 
procedure
X3 - Size (large / small 
and medium)
Model R R2 Adjusted 
R-squared
Standard error of the 
estimate
1 small and medium 1 0.896a 0.802 0.787 0.49043
2 large 1 0.947b 0.897 0.885 0.19492
Source: Own calculation
In the determination of the value of H-statistic the model’s explanatory power (r2) 
is 80.2%  in case of small and medium-sized banks and it equals 89.7% in case of 
large banks. This means that the independent variables anticipate a change in the 
value of H-statistic in case of small and medium-sized banks with 80.2% proba-
bility and in case of large banks with 89.7% probability. 
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Table 5. Interest income equation’s estimated results’ significant variables by size 
categories
X3 Size (large 
/ small and 
medium)
Model
 
Unstandar-
dized 
coefficients
 
Standar-
dized 
coefficients
t The t-test’s 
empirical 
signifi-
cance level
Measurement of 
multicollinearity
     
Standard 
error
Beta
   
Tolerance 
index
VIF
1 small and 
medium 1 -5.798 1.376 -4.213 0
ln (general 
administra-
tive cost)
0.122 0.148 0.093 0.823 0.414 0.24 4.164
ln (interest 
payables) -0.01 0.102 -0.016 -0.101 0.92 0.116 8.649
ln (income 
on other 
(non-in-
terest rate) 
assets)
0.94 0.183 0.949 5.15 0 0.09 11.149
ln (the ratio 
of loans 
to total 
assets)
0.215 0.085 0.167 2.523 0.014 0.693 1.443
0.484 0.137 0.297 3.528 0.001 0.43 2.326
2 large 1 (Constant) 2.612 1.949 1.34 0.187
ln (general 
administra-
tive cost)
0.689 0.126 0.563 5.487 0 0.233 4.3
ln (interest 
payables) -0.139 0.102 -0.18 -1.359 0.181 0.14 7.136
ln (income 
on other 
(non-in-
terest rate) 
assets)
0.401 0.146 0.375 2.748 0.009 0.132 7.603
ln (the ratio 
of loans 
to total 
assets)
-0.87 0.226 -0.253 -3.85 0 0.566 1.766
ln (equity 
on assets) 0.134 0.107 0.076 1.26 0.215 0.674 1.485
a. Dependent 
variable: ln (II)
small and 
medium large
Adjusted R2 0.787 0.885
Number of 
panel data 72 48
0 0.689
Source: Own calculation
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The H-value summarizing the estimated coefficients of the factor prices af-
fecting interest income is zero in case of small and medium-sized banks, as nei-
ther of the two factor prices (interest payables and general administrative costs) 
is significant. 
In case of large banks H-value is 0.689, which is significantly different from 0 
and 1, meaning that in the period of 2005-2010 neither cartel, nor perfect compe-
tition characterized the market of large banks. My estimation reflected medium or 
slightly stronger monopolistic competition for large banks.
 On the basis of the above investigations I found that in Hungary 8 large banks 
give more than 90 percent of the banking sector’s balance sheet total. In my view, 
small and medium-sized banks do not play a major role in the banking market 
competition due to their small proportion, therefore, banking competition can be 
considered as the competition of large banks. 
According to the general view competition improves the banks’ efficiency and 
thus their growth as well. The competitive environment is encouraging to banks’ 
operations and thus their market shares can increase and indirectly their efficien-
cy can be improved. (Northcott 2004) I fully agree with the author on this view.
Conclusions
Hungary’s banking system significantly differs from other national economies of 
the world and even from our own region. It is characterised by a high degree of 
foreign ownership, while the Hungarian-owned banks play a subordinated role in 
the system of commercial banks. The number of banking sector players is rela-
tively high compared to the size of the market. The market structure evolution re-
sulted in 5-6 strong universal banks dominating the Hungarian banking market, 
while the number of medium-sized banks stabilized at around 10-12.
The competition among Hungarian commercial banks is oligopolistic accord-
ing to its nature, the banking market is moderately concentrated and it is unlikely 
to change in the coming years. The banking sector’s competition is practically the 
competition of the eight large banks since the eight large banks give the market 
share of over 90 percent.
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